Discourse and (In)consistency

With due respect to my post immediately preceding this one:

My seminar paper for this past semester was a brief study of a small part of James Paul Gee's Discourse theory, applied to an online debate concerning a particular Christian doctrine. In a related sense, while reading some news today I was reminded that I'm pathetically, morbidly fascinated by the profound polarization of opinion expressed by folks who supply online comments to political stories.

One of the most popular attacks in these polarized situations, including the debate I was studying, is the claim that people from the "other side" are hypocritical. This is a pretty interesting phenomenon once you start to pull it apart. It's worth mentioning that "hypocrite" gets thrown around quite a lot, but I think the words "inconsistent" and "self-contradictory," which are also thrown around a lot, are closer to covering the majority of the cases. So let's stick with the idea of consistency for the rest of the post.

Gee (1989: Literacy, Discourse, and Linguistics: Introduction. Journal of Education , 171 (1)) notes that when we speak (or write, which is first speaking in our heads, I would say), the words we use are accompanied by values, beliefs, gestures, postures, and a myriad of other things, and are part of "saying (writing)-doing-being-valuing-believing combinations," he calls Discourses. You can name these combinations anything you want; in my work I call them "meme complexes," but you can make up your own name if you like. The point is, to be a credible, accepted, card-carrying member of a Discourse, you have to get all the talking, doing, being, valuing, and believing worked out just right. Mess one of them up, come up short in one area, and members of that Discourse will spot in short order that you don't belong. You're not a member of their Discourse. You don't fit in. You're an outsider. Gee claims that we each acquire at least one Discourse for free; it's our primary Discourse that we acquire early in our human development. After this one, most of us pick up additional "secondary" Discourses as we are exposed to various groups and institutions. There are Discourses associated with government and politics, work and careers and professions and crafts, various educational fields, religion, hobbies, and et cetera. Gee notes also that the Discourses which we acquire or attempt to acquire don't always fit together perfectly, and they cause tensions within us. For example, the beliefs of a woman's religious Discourse might conflict with her academic Discourse of Women's Studies. Somehow she has to manage the tension between the two, and she may well figure out how to do so, or if not then one of the Discourses will suffer and possibly be abandoned. So, oftentimes whenever two or more Discourses are competing for our action and demanding that we inhabit them, there's a problem. How do we act consistently in our living? The easy answer would be to avoid being part of a Discourse that creates this tension, but this is not easily done. To do so, really, one would have to remain a child, with only a primary Discourse, for his or her entire life. Long story short, in regard to this reality Gee makes the following statement, which seems fairly innocuous at first: "…humans are not consistent and well integrated from a cognitive or social viewpoint, although most Discourses assume that they are." As I was proofing my paper this past week, it struck me just how vital this passing point (a few sentences in the referenced work of Gee) really is. People are not consistent, but most Discourses assume that they are. This just strikes me, in its brutally simplistic observation, as vitally important in regard to how we try to communicate with one another. Here are the thoughts that have occurred to me so far:

When I am acting from within a Discourse (which I cannot avoid doing), it is assumed by the Discourse (and myself at the moment) that I am being consistent.

Discourses, also, assume that they themselves are consistent—or are made consistent by nature of their being held within a (presumed) consistent individual.

If I, with my repertoire of Discourses, cannot make a "logical" connection between two points for which another person claims that such a connection exists, I assume that person is being inconsistent.

There is a grand narrative, underlying most of our Discourses, that equates consistency with truth.

I assume, therefore, that what I say, value, believe is based in truth. I assume my actions are based in truth.

I assume, then, the other person's are not.

Given my assumption and because the other person defends his position, I assume he is ignorant, stupid, foolish, evil, etc.

Discourses contain lattices of beliefs that arise either: (1) for the sole purpose of making a Discourse appear consistent, or (2) because the Discourse is already assumed to be consistent.

A major portion of our belief systems is composed of these lattices.

We consider the links which compose these lattices to be fundamental elements, fundamental truths, which are on par with the major claims of the Discourse; that is, with the Discourse nodes which the links connect.

Your inconsistency is readily apparent to me because (1) your are inconsistent, and (2) I lack the lattice(s) that makes you appear consistent to yourself.

Notice that this is all based upon nothing more than the mere assumption of consistency.

This assumption is likely nothing more than a link in a latticework of a governing Grand Discourse.

While consistency of systems should remain something we value at a certain level, we must realize that absolute consistency does not exist and should not be the litmus test of "true" views.

If we could get past the idea that truth necessitates something referred to as "logical consistency," a whole bunch of interpersonal and intellectual overhead would cease to exist.